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FOREWORD
Ongoing revelations about Russian meddling in
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election leave policymakers
and the defense community with a set of challenging
questions. How should the United States best counter
and deter these types of activities going forward?
How much of a threat do these types of tactics pose
to democracy? What interventions are consistent with
our national values and the proper role of the military?
Approaches that myopically focus on the latest
headlines will miss the bigger picture. The Strategic
Studies Institute (SSI) believes that these developments demonstrate that the continued growth and
evolution of the cyber domain has reshaped the fundamental nature of information warfare. We must
develop a broader strategic concept that organizes
defense efforts into a cohesive, effective whole. On
this count, Maneuver and Manipulation―authored by
researcher Tim Hwang―is a key contribution to the
discussion as the defense community develops its
approach to the information warfare of the present
day and beyond. Grounding his analysis in a careful
look at how the Internet has transformed persuasion,
he builds a framework that provides important insight
into the nature, goals, conduct, and defense strategies
of modern information warfare.
Maneuver and Manipulation is also a valuable
resource for examining existing thought on online persuasive conflict and its limitations. Mr. Hwang provides a useful analysis that examines and compares
strategic concepts for information warfare among
nation states, focusing on the United States, China, and
Russia. He also reviews the strategic approaches taken
by some of the nonstate actors which have proven to
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be some of the most prolific practitioners of this new
breed of informational conflict―the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria and WikiLeaks.
This monograph is particularly unique because of
the pioneering work of Mr. Hwang in this domain.
As early as 2010, Mr. Hwang was one of the first to
demonstrate that swarms of bots could shape online
discourse and relationships between users on social
media. His subsequent research has tracked the use of
these techniques among state and nonstate actors and
experimented with potential countermeasures in the
space. In this respect, Mr. Hwang writes not just as a
theorist, but with the hard-won experience of a practitioner of modern information warfare.
SSI believes that this monograph will be a useful
resource as the broader U.S. strategic community continues to develop, debate, and decide the shape of
informational conflict in the 21st century.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Ongoing discussion around the Russian development of hybrid warfare and the revelations about
meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election have
focused the public’s attention on the threats posed by
coordinated campaigns of propaganda and disinformation. These recent events have also raised concerns
around the broader challenge posed by the emergence
of a “post-fact society,” the notion that the weakening
ability for civil society and the public to analyze truth
and falsity is creating a threat to the health and sustainability of democratic institutions.
Technology and the Internet, in particular, play a
key role in shaping the flow of information through
society. Not surprisingly, the role of these systems in
enabling new types of information warfare has figured prominently in the discussion as policymakers
and scholars begin to develop their thinking about the
appropriate response to these issues. Platforms such as
Facebook and Google have been seen as having had
a significant role in facilitating Russian propaganda
efforts, incentivizing the distribution of false information, and encouraging the creation of extremist “filter
bubbles.”
As the defense community develops its approach
to countering present-day online propaganda and
disinformation techniques, it will need to place concerns around immediate threats into a broader understanding of the nature of the challenge. It will require,
in short, an articulation of a broad and flexible, unified, strategic concept that encompasses the aspects
of military, diplomatic, economic, informational, and
other matters regarding the strategic situation. This
monograph offers an initial sketch of such a concept,
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proposing one approach to characterizing the strategic
situation in the current information space and, based
on that, some conjectures about the effective conduct
of online information warfare.
The threat and use of operations that aim to shape
perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors are, of course, not
new to the theory or practice of warfare. Whether
directed at the public or adversaries on a battlefield,
these activities―to a greater or lesser extent―have long
been part of the discussion of psychological operations, information operations (IO), military operations
other than war, counterinsurgency, and public diplomacy, among others. In the context of the Internet and
technology more broadly, more recent concepts of
computational propaganda and, less recently, netwar,
also offer a precedent.
This monograph draws on and adapts this lineage
of thinking and others to the current technological and
informational environment. Specifically, it argues the
following:
• Modern information warfare falls somewhere
between topics in the defense space. On the one
hand, online disinformation efforts continue a
long lineage of thinking and tactical innovation
around the use of persuasion and influence in
conflict. On the other, these topics are a salient,
novel form of threat online that introduces a
new set of themes into the discussion of cybersecurity and cyberwarfare strategy. In developing
an effective, strategic concept which captures
the nature of modern information warfare and
the manner in which it is best conducted, the
former needs to be married with the latter.
• Reviewing published strategic works on online
information warfare in the United States,
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Russia, and China, as well as among nonstate
actors, suggests that the theoretical frameworks
in the space remain frustratingly incomplete
and vague. These texts are mostly silent on the
nature of modern information warfare, the conduct of modern information warfare, and the
effective means of defending against campaigns
of information warfare.
• Modern information warfare is characterized
by a cartographic shift: social behavior is now
directly observable at many different scales at
remarkably low cost. One can observe social
reactions to a stimulus as it occurs and compare these reactions across both time and space.
These developments and the concentration of
this data in a small set of platforms change the
nature of information flow and open new possibilities for the strategic development of information warfare.
• This cartographic shift influences the aims of
information warfare. Conflicts shift from contests over the adoption or rejection of certain
ideas and points of view to contests over the
network structure of relationships and strength
of ties within a population. Victory in these conditions entails capturing the ability to shape
these networks toward desired ends, while
defeat entails the inability to deny this influence
to an adversary.
• Liberal democracies face special challenges in
this environment because they must defend
the aggregate amount of social capital or trust
within society. Liberal democracies must also
defend a particular arrangement of social capital―one that gives independent civil society and
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public institutions a primary role. This requirement forces liberal democracies to construct
defensible publics. This effort requires the creation of public systems of detection, support for
robust social networks within society, and clear
policies around the conditions for state intervention in the information space.
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MANEUVER AND MANIPULATION:
ON THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF ONLINE
INFORMATION WARFARE
INTRODUCTION
Ongoing discussion around the Russian development of hybrid warfare and the revelations about
meddling in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election has
focused the public’s attention on the threats posed by
coordinated campaigns of propaganda and disinformation. These recent events have also raised concerns
around the broader challenge posed by the emergence
of a “post-fact society,” the notion that the weakening
ability for civil society and the public to analyze truth
and falsity is creating a threat to the health and sustainability of democratic institutions.1
Technology and the Internet, in particular, play a
key role in shaping the flow of information through
a society. Not surprisingly, the role of these systems
in enabling new types of information warfare has figured prominently in the discussion as policymakers
and scholars begin to develop their thinking about the
appropriate response to these issues.2 Platforms such
as Facebook and Google have been seen as having had
a significant role in facilitating Russian propaganda
efforts, incentivizing the distribution of false information, and encouraging the creation of extremist “filter
bubbles.”3
As the defense community develops its approach
to countering present-day online propaganda and
disinformation techniques, it will need to consider
concerns of immediate threats with a broader understanding of the nature of the challenge. It will require,
in short, an articulation of a unified, strategic concept:
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The course of action accepted as the result of the estimate
of the strategic situation . . . a statement of what is to
be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit
its use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic,
informational, and other measures which stem from it.4

This monograph offers an initial sketch of such a concept, proposing one approach to characterizing the
strategic situation in the current information space
and, based on that, some conjectures about the effective conduct of online information warfare.
The threat and use of operations that aim to shape
perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors are, of course, not
new to the theory or practice of warfare. Whether
directed at the public or adversaries on a battlefield,
these activities―to a greater or lesser extent―have long
been part of the discussion of psychological operations, information operations (IO), military operations
other than war, counterinsurgency, and public diplomacy, among others. In the context of the Internet and
technology more broadly, more recent concepts of
computational propaganda and, less recently, netwar,
also offer a precedent.
This monograph draws on and adapts this lineage
of thinking and others to the current technological
and informational environment. Part I will frame the
discussion, examining the structure of online disinformation and propaganda campaigns and the extent
to which they fall into existing notions of “information warfare.” Part II will examine parallel lines of
strategic thinking that have addressed the question
of information warfare and the changing technological landscape. Part III will evaluate these precedents,
arguing that the changing nature of the web offers a
sharper and more nuanced strategic concept. Part IV
then sketches out the parameters of this approach.
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PART I: THE STATE OF PLAY
Though Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election triggered the present wave of interest in online propaganda campaigns, this most recent
effort is far from unprecedented. Instead, these actions
should be seen as only one particularly dramatic culmination of a range of activities pursued by Russia
and other actors on the web over the past decade.
Developing an effective, strategic approach
requires a characterization of the current environment.
As a means of assessing the current state of play, this
section reviews what is currently known about these
efforts, explores the potential future routes for their
development, and asks whether existing categories of
“information warfare” in the defense literature adequately capture the phenomena.
The Triad of Online Disinformation―Media,
Advertising, and Hacking
While it may not have been the first, the 2016 campaign serves as a useful representative of the range
of techniques that are being used to spread disinformation and manipulate discourse online. Three core
components appeared in the Russian effort which are
characteristic of campaigns seen elsewhere.
First was the use of formal and informal media
outlets to shape public narratives and spread disinformation. Most prominently, the Russian campaign leveraged state-run media outlets such as Russia Today
(RT) and Sputnik to distribute disinformation and
support then-candidate Donald Trump.5 These more
obvious channels were accompanied by a range of less
visible efforts. This included the recruitment of paid
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online trolls and automated fake identities―“bots”―
to amplify scandals and spread disinformation on
a grassroots level.6 This included promoting claims
around biased or unfair news coverage as well as the
propagation of a series of conspiracy narratives such
as “Pizzagate,” which claimed that candidate Hillary Clinton and members of her staff were involved
in an underground child sex trafficking ring.7 This
use of automation to “spam” disinformation alongside human agent provocateurs has been dubbed by
researchers Sam Woolley and Phil Howard as “computational propaganda.”8 Similar patterns have been
seen in campaigns throughout the world, including
Syria, England, Mexico, Ukraine, and Finland.9
Second, the “organic” spread of disinformation
was accelerated through online channels of advertising. Advertising played a role in two aspects. In
the first, Russian operatives leveraged the advertising platforms offered by platforms like Google and
Facebook.10 This allowed the highly targeted spread
of false information about the candidates and facilitated messaging efforts attempting to create a polarization between opposing political advocacy groups
within society more generally.11 These state-driven
efforts were also supported by a global ecosystem of
profit-driven actors who benefited from the spread of
widely shared disinformation. From teenage bloggers
in Macedonia to entrepreneurs in Los Angeles, “fake
news” was also supported by independent businesses
seeking to drive traffic to their sites to generate advertising revenue.12 The influence of advertising is not
isolated to the Russian case: Chinese state-run media
have also been experimenting with Facebook advertising as a way of driving their propaganda efforts.13
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Third, the Russian campaign also incorporated the
use of hacking to compromise the networks of the U.S.
Democratic National Committee and leak information
discrediting the Clinton campaign and staff.14 This
served as a means of disrupting the operations of campaign targets as well as a way of building the credibility of outlets that could later assist in the spread of
doctored “leaks” to spread disinformation. This use of
cyberattacks as a complement to information warfare
operations was also observed during the 2017 French
Presidential election and in the blockade of the United
Arab Emirates later that year.15
These building blocks of social manipulation―
media, advertising, and hacking―are widely available
and can be deployed at a low cost. This allows both
well-resourced state actors and more informal groups
to take advantage of them. Terrorist networks have
been particularly prolific users of these techniques.
Groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) have leveraged the power of online
communication as a means of increasing their prominence, recruiting collaborators, and maximizing the
emotional impact of their efforts.16 Researchers have
also documented the use of these techniques by the
loosely connected coalition of far-right and less radical
“alt-right” communities that spread conspiracy theories during the 2016 U.S. Presidential campaign and
have continued to remain active beyond the election.17
The Future
The tactics of online propaganda are constantly
evolving as state and nonstate actors continue to
invest in and experiment with these techniques. Two
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major technological trends seem poised to augment
the impact of these campaigns going forward.
First, recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence―specifically in the subfield of machine learning―seem likely to make it increasingly easy to
fabricate realistic imitations of real-world video and
audio.18 One recent demonstration from researchers
at Stanford, Face2Face, demonstrates how machine
learning can create a believable representation of the
face of a public figure from open source video.19 These
can be used in turn to “puppet” the face as desired.20
In the demonstration, this technique is used to create
believable “interviews” with Barack Obama, Donald
Trump, and Vladimir Putin.21 Similarly, WaveNet
software, released in 2016, leverages machine learning
to synthesize voices and other sounds to make them
much more believable than in the past.22
As the computational cost of these types of techniques continues to decline, they become more available to actors interested in using these techniques to
supplement campaigns of disinformation. A disinformation effort might have an increased ability to create
believable videos of political leaders and celebrities
that can be widely shared and more challenging to
refute. These technologies might also be integrated to
provide swarms of bots with more realistic “personalities” and behaviors that evade the detection systems
of social media platforms and are difficult for users to
discern easily as fakes. To that end, machine learning
may expand the potential scope of these campaigns,
enabling automated systems to better substitute for
human agents in spreading disinformation.
Second, in the past 2 decades, the field of quantitative social science has grown considerably, aided
by the availability of large, rich datasets about social
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behavior enabled by the Internet.23 Dubbed by one
researcher to be a new field of “social physics,”
data abundance has allowed researchers to gain a
deeper understanding of a range of social behaviors,
from how information spreads through groups and
becomes “viral” to what leads certain groups to be
robust against or vulnerable to false information.24
It is possible that these research findings will be
used by malicious actors seeking to enhance the impact
of their disinformation campaigns. Future perpetrators of these efforts may be able to tailor more accurately and target messaging for maximal persuasive or
behavioral impact. These efforts may also allow these
actors to better assess “vulnerabilities” in a social network―individuals who may be both susceptible to a
messaging campaign and able to influence others.
Beyond simply increasing the potential efficacy of disinformation efforts, more accurate targeting may also
enable adversaries to achieve their aim without the
extensive blanketing of a population with messaging.
This may make campaigns more subtle and challenging to detect going forward.
The State of Play: Causal Ambiguity
and Strategic Relevance
While at the time of this writing it is clear that many
actors are investing in and experimenting with online
propaganda, it is important to note that empirical support for the causal impact of these campaigns remains
unclear. Due to the opaque nature of the campaigns
conducted by Russia and others, it is challenging to
assess accurately whether these efforts have a relevant
impact on behaviors like voting. This situational fogginess also extends to potential countermeasures and
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interventions that might be implemented. It is ambiguous, for example, whether interventions such as
labeling content for information quality can lower the
perceived credibility of “fake news.”25 More generally,
it is even unclear if the default state of the Internet
exacerbates or reduces issues such as polarization.26
Research continues to expand our understanding of
these campaigns and their impact, but there remains
much that is not known.27
Even in light of this ambiguity, these online techniques and campaigns of social manipulation should
be a source of genuine concern to the national security
and defense communities for a number of reasons. For
one, the immediate case of 2016 may not be a useful
guide to the effectiveness of these campaigns in general. The continued investment in these techniques by
actors like Russia and China and a range of nonstate
actors warrants observation and holds the possibility
that continued research and development may make
these methods more impactful going forward.
Second, the impact of these campaigns may not
depend on their actual ability to shape concrete behaviors like voting. Even the suggestion or intentional
revelation of interference may cast doubt on the legitimacy of the electoral process and democratic institutions. The numerous investigations and hearings
following the 2016 election season attest to the ability
of these efforts to create mistrust, drive polarization,
and distract from governance.
Third, even in the absence of active adversarial
efforts, the potential emergence of a “post-fact society”
presents questions about the ability of policymakers
and society at large to make accurate determinations
about national security and the use of military force.
Insofar as the “home front” and public opinion are
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critical aspects of military operations in a democratic
society, a reduction in the value of truthful information is a national security matter.28 At the very least,
such considerations make an accurate and nuanced
assessment of risks a high priority.
The More Things Change, the More
They Stay the Same
From the perspective of the defense community,
these online disinformation activities both are a reaffirmation of the past and serve as a novel provocation.
In one sense, this present generation of influence campaigns is a natural extension of the history of IO and
information warfare. The Joint Staff defines IO broadly
as “Actions taken to affect adversary information and
information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.”29 These disinformation campaigns are rightly categorized as merely the
latest in the evolution of psychological operations,
often categorized as a subset of IO. Like other psychological operations, the primary objective of these activities is to:
convey selected information and indicators to foreign
audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.30

To that end, our existing conceptions of IO are
capacious enough to describe and contextualize the
new tactics enabled by the web and technology more
broadly. We should not treat campaigns like the one
executed during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election
as unprecedented. Indeed, to do so would ignore the
long history of leafleting, radio broadcasts, and other
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IO efforts taken in earlier generations of conflict.31
While the tactics and strategy of these efforts may
change as the dynamics of information flow through
social change, we can and should see these efforts in
the context of earlier techniques used to achieve the
same end.
These disinformation activities are novel since they
expand the existing frame of discussion around cybersecurity. Literature around cyberwarfare and “cyber”
strategy has tended to focus on the threats arising
from the compromising of systems. One common definition put forth by Richard Clarke defines cyberwar as
“actions . . . to penetrate another nation’s computers
or networks for the purposes of causing damage or
disruption.”32 Technical vulnerability and the extent
to which malicious actors can access and control computers have been the “prevailing focus” of the “global
cyber security community.”33
The use of these networks for the purposes of conducting influence campaigns has been been less frequently seen in the spotlight. “Social engineering” has
often been the center of gravity of the security discussion around topics of influence and persuasion, but
this term fails to capture the online disinformation
campaigns being described here.34 The threats often
described in the social engineering context are ones
in which technical compromise remains the ultimate
objective, and where the deception often takes place
on an individual level.35 In contrast, the information
warfare efforts typified by the 2016 Russian campaign
may aim to influence social behavior as an end in and
of itself. These efforts target large groups―if not societies―rather than individuals.
In that respect, the present generation of online
information warfare falls somewhere between topics
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in the defense space. On the one hand, online disinformation efforts continue a long lineage of thinking
and tactical innovation around the use of persuasion
and influence in conflict. On the other hand, these
topics are a salient, novel form of threat online that
introduces a new set of themes into the discussion of
cybersecurity and cyberwarfare strategy. To develop
an effective, strategic concept that captures the nature
of modern information warfare and how it is best conducted, one needs to marry the former with the latter.
It is key that existing understandings around strategic
influence be informed by the unique dynamics that
information technology introduces into the space.
To inform this analysis, we look to a set of strategic sources that have attempted in some respects to do
precisely this: consider how techniques of influence
and persuasion are relevant and different in the present technological context.
PART II: PARALLEL CONCEPTS OF
INFORMATION WARFARE
Strategic thinking about the nature of information warfare is not new, and neither is thinking about
the ways in which the Internet and technology more
generally shape conflict. As one seeks to articulate a
common, strategic concept that will guide military
activity in the current information environment, it is
important to draw on these sources―both contemporaneous and historical―for guidance.
This section reviews the existing, precedential
thinking around information warfare, with emphasis on work that has considered the ways in which
the Internet has shaped the landscape in which these
activities take place. It examines work within the U.S.
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defense context as well as parallel thinking among
Russian and Chinese thinkers. Of course, persuasion
and the targeted use of influence are not simply a state
affair, as this section also looks at strategic frames
adopted by nonstate actors, such as WikiLeaks and
ISIS. This section will then assess these parallel concepts, arguing that they are limited in characterizing
the present-day nature of informational conflict online.
We exclude here a discussion of strategic thinking
emerging from the advertising and marketing space,
though numerous historical roots connecting this field
to the work of information warfare exist.36 While these
sources do provide valuable insight into the nature of
persuasion in the present technological environment,
they are less helpful in the context of thinking about
broader defense or military strategy. For one, strategic
concepts are specific to the context of an organization.
Commercial actors operate in a significantly different
landscape of opportunities and restraints than information warfare actors. Legal restrictions, for instance,
may act as a significant limitation to the kinds of techniques in which most commercial actors are willing
to engage. Actors in the advertising space may generally refrain from hacking as a means of achieving their
ends, but those in the information warfare space are
not so limited.37
Second, the objectives of marketing actors and
information warfare actors may give rise to very different kinds of campaigns. One objective of an information warfare campaign may be simply to produce
conflict and confusion between groups within a society.38 While the use of invented controversy may be a
means of attempting to build attention around a product or a service in the marketing space, the ultimate
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target is less likely to be simply greater polarization
for its own sake.39
Finally, marketing and commercial actors may also
be attempting to shape very different kinds of motivations. Whereas marketing may attempt to influence
purchase behavior, information warfare may attempt
to motivate targets to make significantly costlier
choices, such as joining an insurgent group, leaking
information, or harassing others online. Behavioral
science suggests that these decisions―both of a greater
personal magnitude and often existing beyond a
strictly “commercial” context―may take place in a
different behavioral calculus than a simple purchase
does.40 This means that the optimal tactics, time frame,
and overall strategic outlook may differ significantly
between domains.
To that end, while elements of the world of advertising overlap somewhat with the kinds of activities
and techniques used in the information warfare context, these broader differences make it more valuable
to focus on precedents which correspond more with
with the defense context.
“Netwar” and U.S. Defense Theory
Within the context of U.S. national security thinking, the work of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt
is perhaps the closest natural precedent for thinking
about the intersection between information technology and information warfare. During the mid-1990s,
these theorists put forth a framework that drew distinctions between the pure compromises of systems
technically and their use as a means of persuasion and
influence.
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In their words, the information revolution enabled
cyberwar―“conducting, and preparing to conduct,
military operations according to information-related
principles. It means disrupting if not destroying . . .
information and communications systems.”41 On the
other hand, these technologies also opened the possibility of what the authors called “netwar”―
“information-related conflict at a grand level between
nations or societies. It means trying to disrupt, damage,
or modify what a target population ‘knows’ or thinks
it knows about itself and the world around it.”42 Richard Szafranski, one contributor to a 1997 collection
of essays on netwar entitled, In Athena’s Camp, characterizes this conflict as a kind of “epistemological”
warfare, targeting “everything a human organism―
an individual or a group―holds to be true or real, no
matter whether that which is held as true or real was
acquired as knowledge or as a belief.”43
The predictions of Arquilla and Ronfeldt have
proven to be particularly prescient in characterizing
the information warfare of recent years. They capture
the challenges of attribution in the online environment, writing:
it is difficult to ascertain who, if anyone in particular, lies
behind a netwar. This may be particularly the case where
a network configured for netwar is transnational and
able to maneuver adroitly and quietly across increasingly
permeable nation-state borders.44

Arquilla and Ronfeldt also successfully predict the
often ambiguous nature of online information warfare, writing, “it may not be clear when a netwar has
started, or how and when it ends. A netwar actor may
engage in long cycles of quietly watching and waiting,
and then swell and swarm rapidly into action.”45
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Beyond merely characterizing the nature of conflict
in modern information warfare, Arquilla’s and Ronfeldt’s key strategic contribution is a set of arguments
around how actors most effectively wage and defend
against netwar. The two authors argue that organizational structure is critical, focusing on “web[s] (or
network[s]) of dispersed, interconnected ‘nodes’ (or
activity centers)” with “no single central leader or
commander.”46 These “network forms of organization” are seen to gain major advantages in the conduct
of netwar as they are able to systematically outmaneuver hierarchical organizations.47 To that end, the strategic crux of modern persuasive or influence warfare
is a race to master an organizational form that enables
the most agile leveraging of the affordances of the
technology.48
This prediction has played out in part. Loosely
organized networks of commercial and ideological actors indeed took an active role in attempting to
spread disinformation during the 2016 U.S. election
and in a number of other recent cases.49 At the same
time, hierarchical state actors have not been forced
to overhaul their organizational structures to take
advantage of the opportunities created by the Internet
for waging netwar. Instead, states have become parts
of networks to achieve their aims without necessarily having to become networks themselves. Russia’s
role in commissioning and orchestrating components
of the 2016 campaign suggests the central role that a
government can continue to play in the planning and
execution of these efforts.
Interestingly, this parallels the development of
strategic thinking in Russia and China on the topic of
information warfare. While theorists in those countries are in agreement with Arquilla and Ronfeldt on
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the tactical opportunities made possible by the Internet as a tool, they do not appear to have been so quick
in adopting similar prescriptions around an organizational form.
State Actors: Russia
Arquilla and Ronfeldt were not the only ones
attempting to clarify and develop a framework for
thinking about military strategy in the modern information environment. Theorists in the Russian and
Chinese national security community have also considered these issues, often coming to parallel conclusions with their counterparts in the United States.
Most discussed in the Russian context is the
so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine,” which originates
from a 2013 article entitled, “The Value of Science is
in the Foresight” by Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the
General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.50 The piece tackles “a tendency toward blurring the
lines between the states of war and peace” in the conflicts of the 21st century.51 Tactically, the article focuses
on the fact that the “role of nonmilitary means of
achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and,
in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force
of weapons in their effectiveness.”52
Within Gerasimov’s framework, propaganda and
information warfare appear as only one of a number of
“asymmetric actions” which enable the “nullification
of an enemy’s advantages in armed conflict.”53 Warfare in the information space runs alongside robotic
systems, “initiations of military operations by groupings of line-units (forces) in peacetime,” and the “mass
use of high-precision weaponry.”54 Gerasimov highlights the importance of these agile tools in creating “a
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permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state.”55
Particularly in light of Russian meddling in the
2016 U.S. Presidential election, Gerasimov’s article has
seen coverage in the mainstream press.56 However,
the degree to which a “Gerasimov Doctrine,” and the
“hybrid warfare” it describes actually guide Russian
military strategy remains an open question of debate.57
One domain expert has written, “there is a general
consensus in Russian military circles that hybrid war
is a completely Western concept. . . . The Russian
military has been adamant that they do not practice
a hybrid-war strategy.”58 Another observer has noted
that a more recent 2016 article by Gerasimov “entirely
contradicts the widely held interpretation of his February 2013 article and implies his earlier article was
being misread and misinterpreted outside Russia.”59
“The Value of Science” is also less a complete strategic
concept and more a call to action. Gerasimov writes
that “[Russia has] only a superficial understanding of
asymmetrical forms and means. . . . the importance of
military science, which must create a comprehensive
theory of such actions, is growing.”60
Even in spite of this ambiguity, it is still valuable
to examine “The Value of Science” as a point of reference for thinking about how military officials beyond
the United States have contextualized information
warfare and its importance in modern conflict. On the
one hand, “The Value of Science” is consonant in part
with much of the thinking of Arquilla and Ronfeldt.
Both highlight the ambiguous space between war and
peace that information warfare occupies.61 Both note
the permeable nature of national borders and the ability to project a contested “front” through many parts
of a target society.62 Both argue that nonmilitary means
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have expanded in importance and that “information
operations (indirect actions) have reached a point in
development where they can take on strategic tasks.”63
Gerasimov and netwar theory diverge in one
important respect. Hybrid warfare still frames state
actors as the primary protagonists in the strategic
landscape of information warfare. Indeed, “The Value
of Science” opens with a consideration of the “color
revolutions” of the Middle East and North Africa
during the 2010s.64 Events like the Arab Spring are
understood to be a manifestation of a new hybrid
warfare of regime change driven primarily by Western governments.65
In that respect, Gerasimov characterizes new technologies as primarily opening up new opportunities
and tools that are leveraged by state actors. Netwar
takes a different tack, arguing that the technologies
themselves enable new types of actors that will be systematically more nimble and effective than “hierarchical” government counterparts.66 These actors include
a range of diffuse, decentralized organizations, from
transnational criminal networks to loosely joined terrorist cells.67 In Arquilla’s and Ronfeldt’s writings,
these new networks become the primary antagonist in
modern information warfare and require fundamental
organizational changes to enable traditional institutions to compete with them.68
As discussed earlier, these dynamics have not
played out in an absolute sense: network actors have
indeed come to be prominent protagonists in driving
online information warfare, but state actors have continued to play a significant role without being forced
to fully become networks themselves. This contrast
between U.S. and Russian strategic sources characterizes a similar contrast across U.S. and Chinese literature as well.
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State Actors: China
Paralleling U.S. netwar and Russian hybrid warfare is the Chinese strategic framework around the
“Three Warfares,” which trifurcates the broad, sprawling category of information warfare into psychological
warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare.69 The first
category, encompassing efforts which “undermine an
enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through
operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations,” falls into the “classic” definitions
which focus on the use of psychological operations in
support of military operations.70
The other two warfares are arguably more unique.
One, “media warfare,” is aimed at “influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support
for China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary
from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests.”71
The second, “legal warfare,” “uses international and
domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert
Chinese interests.”72
In 2003, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s)
highest military policymaking body―the Central Military Commission (CMC)―endorsed this framework.
One 2011 report by the U.S. Secretary of Defense to
Congress concluded that this endorsement “[reflects]
China’s recognition that as a global actor, it will benefit from learning to effectively utilize the tools of
public opinion, messaging, and influence.”73 One 2014
PLA analysis called this framework a “major innovation” in the political work of the Chinese military. The
PLA has integrated training on these topics into its
organization.74

19

The Three Warfares should be viewed in light of
The Science of Military Strategy, the “apex of the PLA’s
professional military literature on the study of war.”75
The 2013 edition of this text highlights the concept of
huayuquan―essentially, “the capability to control the
narrative in a given scenario . . . [or] discursive power.”76 Contesting and controlling huayuquan become
the essential objective of information warfare, requiring the effective integration of the Three Warfares.77
This corresponds to The Science of Military Strategy’s views on the changing nature of warfare, which
emphasizes that future conflict will incorporate conflicts of “political, economic, social, and legal” systems, and will be increasingly “Unmanned, invisible,
and inaudible.”78
As with hybrid warfare, dispute exists around
the extent to which these strategic approaches have
shaped specific activities on the ground. Some U.S.
analyses link the Three Warfares to a range of actions
taken by the PLA in the past decade.79 For their part,
Chinese researchers―like their Russian counterparts―
have criticized Western analyses of China’s persuasive efforts, arguing that a “[tendency] to confuse the
personal views of Chinese government officials with
comprehensive national strategy and policies” has led
to “an obfuscated understanding of China’s strategic
motivation[s].”80 Unrestricted Warfare, a 1999 monograph by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui―at the time,
two senior colonels in the PLA―is often cited in this
context.81
Nevertheless, these texts serve as a useful jumping-off point for thinking about the many approaches
to managing information warfare in the contemporary
online ecosystem. On that count, what is openly available about Chinese thinking indicates a synthesis of
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sorts, combining themes from writings on both netwar
and hybrid warfare.
Chinese military thinking sees “information warfare” from the same vantage point that Arquilla and
Ronfeldt adopt. The objective of information warfare
may not be simply to complement or substitute military operations, but to aim to control the “epistemological” dimension of a society. This is in contrast to
the framing given by Gerasimov in “The Value of
Science,” which sees information warfare as only
one of a set of asymmetric tactics used to nullify military advantages. At the same time, these strategic
frameworks still exist within the existing, top-down,
command-and-control architecture of the PLA; in that
respect, Chinese military thinking borrows from a
Gerasimov-style approach which eschews the broader
organizational changes advocated for in the netwar
literature.
Nonstate Actors: WikiLeaks and ISIS
The Internet and the democratization of computing power have expanded the field of actors which
are able to engage effectively in information warfare. Indeed, some of the most nimble practitioners of
modern information warfare are arguably not wellresourced states but nonstate actors. To that end, a
review of the strategic approaches in the space must
include some of the thinking emerging from these
groups. Two case studies provide a useful sampling
of strategic concepts emerging beyond the formal military context: WikiLeaks and ISIS.
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WikiLeaks
Launched in 2006, WikiLeaks is, by its own description, an international “media organization” which is
focused on acquiring and releasing large caches of data
and information that has been classified or censored
and that deals with the subjects of war, intelligence
operations, and “corruption.”82 An outlet for leaked
materials, the site played a notable role in the 2010
“Cablegate” by releasing hundreds of thousands of
classified cables sent by the U.S. State Department.83 In
2016, the site published a set of leaked emails from the
U.S. Democratic National Committee which the intelligence community claims was supplied to the organization by Russian hackers.84 The organization also
played a role in helping to promote conspiracy theories about candidate Clinton during the campaign.85
While not articulating a cohesive strategic concept
in the military sense, founder Julian Assange’s writings and public comments do suggest a particular
model for thinking about modern information warfare. One 2006 essay, Conspiracy as Governance, suggests thinking of authoritarian regimes as connected
graphs: networks of more or less important players
with more or less important ties with one another.86
For Assange, these individual units form a single,
cohesive organism described as “a system of interacting organs, a beast with arteries and veins . . . [but]
unable to comprehend and control the forces in its
environment.”87
Technology plays a major role in the strategic narrative of WikiLeaks and Assange. Since the strength
of such a “conspiratorial” network is based on the
number and strength of the links between its members, the Internet plays a role in “increasing the speed
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of accuracy of the [sic] their interactions” and expanding the “maximum size a conspiracy may achieve
before it breaks down.”88
Given such a framing, effective information warfare relies on an ability to take actions that erode the
viability of the links between participants in the conspiracy.89 Assange suggests a strategy which “deceive[s]
or blind[s] a conspiracy by distorting or restricting the
information available to it [or] unstructured attacks
on links or through throttling and separating [italics
in original].”90 One powerful technique is the use of
leaks, which “induce[s] fear and paranoia in its leadership and planning coterie” and “result[s] in minimization of efficient internal communications mechanisms
(an increase in cognitive ‘secrecy tax’).”91 This inhibition of effective group activity, the essay argues, slows
the action of a targeted conspiracy until it is unable to
adapt effectively to the environment around it.92
Networks also play a significant role in the strategic thinking of WikiLeaks, not just in its offensive
approach, but in its internal organizational doctrines
as well.
The WikiLeaks approach toward information warfare overlaps in part with the strategic thinking emerging in the national security context. As in netwar,
hybrid warfare, and the Three Warfares, WikiLeaks
implicitly recognizes the potency of tools beyond traditional munitions to impair and destroy institutions.
Paralleling netwar, WikiLeaks also highlights the competition between organizational forms, with smaller,
more concentrated hierarchies on one side, and diffuse, nimble networks on the other. As with Arquilla
and Ronfeldt, one tension is the extent to which the
recent decade bears out the prediction that networks
on their own would gain a systematic advantage
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against hierarchies. To the extent that WikiLeaks itself
collaborated with the Russian Government to achieve
mutual ends during the 2016 U.S. election, the practical operation of WikiLeaks may be more complicated
than suggested by its doctrinal theory.
There are also two nuances worth noting. Though
concepts of netwar and the strategic concepts guiding
WikiLeaks share a common agreement that technology empowers networked actors, they disagree as to
whether the technology also enforces openness. For
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, some of the most prolific and
successful practitioners of netwar are secretive terrorist and criminal networks.93 In contrast, Assange
asserts that “in a world where leaking is easy, secretive or unjust systems are nonlinearly hit relative to
open, just systems.”94 Secretive systems are “exquisitely vulnerable” to mass leaking.95
Second, the specific details of network structure
play an important role in the information warfare of
WikiLeaks. Leaks are a primary tool in part because
they erode the trust necessary for target networks to
communicate and coordinate their actions effectively.
For Assange, this depends very much on the topology
of relationships between supporters and the actions
necessary for modifying that pattern of connections at
scale. This is somewhat unique among the precedents
reviewed earlier. What is publicly available about
hybrid warfare and the Three Warfares does not dwell
on the network structure of mass movements, in part
because they are written from the perspective of militaries which do not rely on those movements. Arquilla
and Ronfeldt do examine matters of specific network
structure, although they credit dense networks for
their operational agility, rather than their “computational” capacity.96
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ISIS
ISIS also serves as a useful source of parallel concepts in evaluating nonstate or proto-state thinking
around modern information warfare. As has been
noted by numerous commentators elsewhere, the use
of IO has been core to the growth of ISIS.97 The organization maintains an elaborate structure for producing
and localizing media, with a formal Ministry of Media
accompanying regional media bureaus and grassroots
supporters.98 As one researcher describes it:
the media proficiency of the [Islamic State] exists because
of an extensive media infrastructure that allows it to
produce high-quality, timely products in different
languages to different audiences that fit the narrative that
the group wishes to convey.99

One official publication from ISIS, entitled, Media
Man, You Are a Mujāhid Too, serves as a point of entry
in thinking about the strategic approach underlying
these information warfare efforts.100 Published in April
2016, Media Man is a short, motivational pamphlet
written for a broad set of “media operatives”―a term
which applies to “frontline cameramen [as much] as it
does to self-appointed social media disseminators.”101
The pamphlet attempts to frame propaganda activity
as core to the religious jihad, arguing that, in certain
cases, “verbal jihad is more important than jihad of the
sword,” and that “media rockets exceed in their ferocity and danger the flames of bombs dropped from
airplanes.”102
Importantly, Media Man articulates an approach to
the conduct of information warfare. Researcher Charlie Winter frames this as a tripartite set of strategies:
framing ISIS as a positive alternative to sympathetic
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audiences, engaging in counter-speech to refute claims
made by the United States and its allies, and creating
media “weapons” which reduce the morale and effectiveness of ISIS’s adversaries.103
These three pillars are not novel concepts in the
history of strategic thought around information warfare. However, Media Man does emphasize one element that seems to apply with particular force in the
current technological environment of information
warfare: that polarization can generate salient benefits
as much as persuasive efforts can. The pamphlet notes
that well-targeted media weapons are able to “make
adversaries act irrationally by ‘infuriating them’ and
ensnaring policymakers into ill-conceived knee-jerk
politics.”104
Researcher Haroro J. Ingram has called this tactic
“baiting,” observing that ISIS information warfare
frequently is “not about winning over ‘undecided’
viewers, but unambiguously reinforcing the perceptions and polarizing the support of friends and foes
alike.”105 Polarization renders a number of useful benefits to ISIS. It potentially provokes a disproportionate response from adversaries that creates real-world
crises of which ISIS can take advantage.106 Polarization
can produce notoriety among sympathetic audiences
and create the opportunity to recruit the like-minded.107 Polarization also serves to puncture the media
“halo” suggesting that “America is this unconquerable
nation that is undivided, undefeated, and can never be
thwarted.”108
It is important to note that this strategic approach
is based on a set of understandings about the proclivities of the present-day media ecosystem. The Management of Savagery―a jihadi text published in 2004 which
would become the “blueprint” of the Islamic State―
advises readers to “study the West’s media so they
26

could understand how best to mimic its methods of
persuasion.”109 Ingram also reports an interview with
one senior producer from a Syrian opposition radio
station that stated, “[ISIS] made a media trap and all of
the Western media fell in it. They know the fears and
images that the Western media is hungry for, so [ISIS]
give it and the media spreads it.”110
This approach to information warfare has also
been shared by others. As researcher Whitney Phillips
has documented, the long-standing online culture of
“trolls” has existed in a symbiotic relationship with
the mass media.111 Trolls generate shocking and polarizing incidents, which traditional and social media
spotlights in turn.112 This attention incentivizes further
action by the trolls and acts as a recruiting medium
for others attracted by this activity. Others have documented a similar dynamic in the activities and tactics of the alt-right in their manipulation of the media
ecosystem.113
As in the WikiLeaks case, the information warfare
strategy of ISIS both parallels and diverges from the
defense thinking emerging from the military domain.
Media Man and the activities of ISIS in practice evince
an understanding of the role that information plays as
a significant asymmetric tool. In this sense, the strategic concept of information warfare in the ISIS context parallels the recognition of a changing battlefield
articulated in Gerasimov’s “The Value of Science”
article. Structurally, the elaborate media operation
established by ISIS also seems to follow the approach
taken in China and Russia which attempts to fit existing command-and-control structures into the evolving conflict environment, rather than adopt the more
diffuse, crowd-driven strategy seen in netwar or the
WikiLeaks case.
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Assessing Existing Precedents
Strategic thinking on influence and persuasion has
not remained static. Many state and nonstate actors
have considered the evolving strategy and tactics of
waging information warfare against the backdrop
of the significant technological change of the past 2
decades. This allows us to assess the current state
of military thinking on the topic and where it might
require revision or renovation.
On one level, these precedents appear to do a good
job of capturing some of the unique aspects of information warfare in the current technological environment. Strategists in the United States, Russia, and
China consistently underscore the growing relevance
of information warfare as an asymmetric technique.
They agree on the extent to which technology and the
changing nature of warfare result in an environment
where influence and persuasion become significant
means, sometimes equivalent means, of achieving
military ends. Multiple theorists―from Arquilla and
Ronfeldt to Assange and the PLA―have refocused the
goals of information warfare; whereas simply supporting troops on a battlefield was once the goal, now,
shaping the social landscape has become a potential
end in and of itself. Both the writings and information
warfare practices of ISIS and WikiLeaks highlight the
tactical gambits of polarization and leaking that have
proven to be a potent means of manipulating discourse in the current online environment.
Existing work on the strategy of online information warfare is useful in these respects. This literature
does characterize core elements of what is potentially
destabilizing about the 2016 disinformation effort in
the United States and the techniques that are likely
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to see further development going forward. However,
there is much that remains missing from these strategic concepts―or at least what is publicly available
about them.
Existing theory is limited in its thinking about the
essential nature of information warfare and how it is
changed by technology. What precisely is being targeted in an informational conflict? How is information warfare won or lost? “Influenc[ing] the emotions,
motives, [and] objective reasoning” of a target population may be the objective, but the literature is vague
about how this happens, and how technology may
create a new environment for accomplishing this task.
The literature is also mostly silent as to the optimal
conduct of information warfare. How should operations be launched, and what do they look like? What
are the tools of modern information warfare, and how
are they integrated into operations? Many theorists
seem to assume implicitly that information warfare
can be comfortably waged within the existing military hierarchy, though the success of nonstate actors
suggests that alternative models may be equally or
more successful. The strategic thinking of netwar and
WikiLeaks advocate for these different organizational
forms, although they perhaps underestimate the continuing effectiveness of state actors in the space. An
approach is needed which joins these two views.
These precedential works also overwhelmingly
focus on the projection of force, rather than examining the question of defensive approach. Frequently,
theorists adopt the frame of how the Internet and
related technologies open new opportunities to attack
and undermine targets. What is left unsaid is how
a military should tackle the question of defending
society against online campaigns of propaganda and
manipulation.
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The existing literature on the military strategy of
information warfare and how technology shapes it
may, therefore, articulate aspects of strategy without
fully cohering into a broader strategic concept per se.
Three missing components are needed: a more thorough account of the nature of the conflict, an examination of how information warfare is best conducted,
and an extension of the thinking to the questions of
defense. Can a more complete strategic concept for the
current technological environment be articulated?
PART III: TOWARD A NEW
STRATEGIC CONCEPT
This section offers one potential sketch of what a
strategic concept for influence and persuasion might
look like in the present information environment. In
particular, it focuses on the impact that increased visibility of social behavior produces in the nature and
conduct of, and defensive approaches to, information
warfare.
One important caveat is warranted. In “Why cyber
war will not and should not have its grand strategist,”
Martin Libicki puts forth a provocative thesis that
casts doubt on the idea that “a classic strategic treatment of cyber war is possible, or, even if it were, it
would be particularly beneficial.”114 One key argument
he advances is that cyberspace is “ill-suited for grand
strategic theories,” in part because it is rapidly changing in many important respects.115 As an illustration,
he points out how the core nature of the threat in the
cyber domain has shifted over time, from individual,
“rough-and-ready” hackers with manually deployed
exploits to teams that build large-scale, remotely controlled malware tools.116
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Libicki’s critique highlights a relevant point for
this topic as well. Regardless of whether an enduring grand strategy is possible, the rapid change of the
underlying technology implies that strategic concepts
may go quickly out of date. This applies in the classic cyberwarfare context as well as in the context of
online information and disinformation efforts. In the
mid-1990s, Arquilla’s and Ronfeldt’s netwar theories
described an Internet that predated the mass adoption of smartphones and which had only begun to
see the impact of the search engine. Writing in 2006,
Julian Assange described an Internet prior to the mass
adoption of social networks like Facebook and Twitter. These products and services change the nature of
information flow through the web, and so change the
conduct of strategic persuasion and influence.
On this count, it is worth setting aside the effort to
articulate a “grand,” permanent strategy in the space
and, instead, ask the more pragmatic question of what
strategic concept should guide information warfare
for the Internet as it exists in the late 2010s. Doing so
requires a characterization of how technology shapes
the broader persuasive landscape beyond the narrow
military and national security context.
Strategic Situation: The Cartographic Shift in
Information Warfare
Articulating a strategic concept requires an “estimate of the strategic situation.”117 One place to begin
may simply be to ask why existing literature and doctrinal thinking have been vague on questions of the
nature of information warfare, its conduct, and the
proper approaches toward defense.
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One potential explanation is that the environment
of strategic persuasion has traditionally existed in a
dense fog of war. The moods and opinions of a target
population could only be sampled through intermittent, expensive polling, and the topology of links
connecting individuals within a society could only
be speculated about or discussed in a general way.118
Actors engaging in information warfare were limited
in how they might target their campaigns, the scope
of the tactics they could undertake, and their ability to
evaluate the effectiveness of a given technique. Such
an environment inhibits the articulation of crisp strategies and concrete doctrines.
The evolution of the Internet has shifted this
landscape in a dramatic way. The social interactions
of many publics around the world now take place
through a digital medium. This medium is capturing
an extraordinarily detailed and nuanced record of
individual and group behaviors.
This has been facilitated by a few developments
that have shaped the web in the past 2 decades. Social
media’s rise and wide acceptance make it the primary
source of the Internet-enabled mass collection of social
data.119 The adoption of mobile devices has enabled
this collection to persist throughout the course of an
entire day, allowing an ever-richer temporal understanding of group social behavior.120 The establishment of advertising as the core business model of the
web created incentives to store and organize Internet
users’ behavioral data and make it available to third
parties.121
The result is that social behavior is now directly
observable at many different levels at remarkably
low cost. It is possible to peer into small communities
of niche interest and zoom out to examine the entire
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landscape of social activity. This record also grants a
time series perspective that was previously costly to
acquire. One can observe social reactions to a stimulus
as they occur and compare these reactions across both
time and space. These developments and the concentration of data in a small set of platforms change the
nature of information flow and so open new possibilities for the strategic development of information
warfare.
Even in light of these shifts, it is important to keep
in mind that the Internet is just a medium through
which social activity takes place. While it has come to
dominate some aspects of social life, the map is still
not the territory. The Internet only captures a part of
the behaviors, large and small, within a society. What
is publicly available may also represent only one particular lens on social activity within a public. The
types of interactions posted to open, public platforms
like Twitter and Facebook will contrast with the data
flowing through trusted, private communication networks on services like Signal and Whatsapp.
The social data of the Internet is not representative
in that sense―and may be particularly unrepresentative in regions with low Internet penetration or where
access to the network is only permitted to particular
segments of a society. The analysis below may apply
with less force in these contexts.
However, as with the introduction of radar during
World War II, the increased ability to see―even in a
limited set of contexts―can produce concrete changes
in the strategic approaches which succeed in the battlefield.122 This “cartographic shift” in our ability to
visualize and understand social behavior has produced significant and parallel changes in the fields of
economics, advertising, and sociology, and will also
shape the conduct of information warfare.
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The Nature of Modern Information Warfare
This cartographic shift changes the nature of information warfare. It does so on two fronts, shaping not
only the focus of what is targeted in information warfare but also the aims of conflict in the space as well.
From Targeting Beliefs to Targeting Networks
Earlier campaigns of influence attempted to shape
particular beliefs or opinions held by a population writ
large and conflicts between actors centered on contesting whether a given idea would predominate within a
target audience. The Internet makes practicable operations which are aimed at influencing a new dimension―not on contesting particular ideas per se, but on
the granular manipulation of underlying relationships
and networks of trust among individuals. Whereas
earlier campaigns may have aimed to influence the
beliefs that an individual had about the strength or
effectiveness of his or her government, the contemporary technological environment enables campaigns to
aim to alter whom that individual communicates and
socializes with and those whom the person considers
credible.
Granted, targeting the connections between groups
within a society has long been a stated objective of
information warfare campaigns. However, limited by
the capacity to see and understand social behavior at
scale, these tactics and strategic thinking have typically
been forced to rely on crude pictures of society and
the relationships between institutions. Campaigns,
for instance, might work to attack the trust between a
government and its people or erode the sympathy of a
population for the military.123
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However, “government,” “people,” and “military”
are simplifications of a more complex reality. Masses
of individuals and the connections among them make
up these groups and the hierarchies within them.
Rather than talking about media outlets, we might talk
about the editors of these companies and the circles of
connections they rely on for story leads. Rather than
talking about readers as an undifferentiated mass,
we might talk about the specific clusters of individuals that regularly consume content from a particular
outlet and the relationships between them. This is a
kind of “social wiring,” formed by the complex web of
formal relationships, friendships, acquaintanceships,
and other connections which exist between people
and which enable institutions and social groups to
function on a day-to-day basis.
The Internet as a medium exposes this detailed
social wiring within large institutions and reveals
smaller groups that may have been practically impossible to identify in the past. The ability to map these
connections and activities allows the targeting of those
relationships in a manner and scale that was previously impossible or prohibitively expensive. Modern
information warfare can think less about rough categories of demographic segments, groups, and institutions, and more about individuals, specific networks
of relationships, and the flow of information between
clusters of people.
To illustrate, consider an IO aimed at encouraging
a mass movement to mobilize and take action against a
target government. In an earlier era, those conducting
such a persuasive campaign would have been limited
by the scope of what was practically knowable. While
some prominent dissidents might be publicly known
to the mainstream press, it might be challenging to
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identify quickly influential but more low-key figures
in a movement. Importantly, it would be difficult to
rapidly and cheaply ascertain which members of the
public are sympathetic to anti-government sentiment.
Strategy in such an environment would require the
planner of this hypothetical IO to simply attempt to
rally “dissident elements” broadly writ or identify
known groups such as student activist organizations
as a way of targeting messaging.
The Internet creates an environment where these
key facts about individuals are more easily acquired.
The public organizing activity of activists on social
media platforms provides a means by which to
compile rosters quickly of the relevant actors in an
anti-government movement. It becomes possible to
assess which citizens are sympathetic to this movement by monitoring the public response to dissident
messaging online and measuring the degree to which
specific activists are able to rally the public toward
certain actions. One might also be able to map the connections between specific dissident leaders and the
audiences that they are most able to engage with and
motivate to action. This detailed data reduces dependence on the targeting of broadly defined segments of
the population and enables a focus on individual dissidents and their connections to others.
This visibility translates into an increased capacity to manipulate. The Internet not only provides the
means by which to see and understand social behavior
in a way that was previously extremely expensive, but
it also allows for targeting and intervention. It is now
possible to identify a community of interest, listen in
on a conversation, and then take an action which intervenes in that community from a global distance. This
might look like an effort to grow bonds of trust and
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norms between key clusters of individuals or, simply,
to encourage a pattern of relationships between individuals in a society.
To return to our example, a mapping of the
social media environment might identify clusters of
influential individuals who are sympathetic to antigovernment sentiment but not yet mobilized to action.
One campaign might focus on cultivating social ties
between these promising clusters and active dissidents who have proven successful in mobilizing similar individuals in the past. This effort might, therefore,
aim to grow the number of participants in a mass
movement and spark action among a broader cluster
of citizens.
The capacity to target these social ties is important because experimental evidence suggests that the
structure of social connections exerts a deep, causal
influence on beliefs and behavior.124 Network structure shapes our political affiliations, health habits, and
even the likelihood of divorce.125 Manipulating this
network of relationships can, therefore, influence the
entire structure of beliefs and behaviors within a society or a target group.
Consider our hypothetical campaign once more.
Mapping the web of social connections might reveal
that our dissident groups―and those sympathetic to
them―are largely in their own social universe. These
individuals might only socialize with one another and
lack substantial connections to the rest of the population. However, this analysis might show that these
dissident elements share a range of common interests with the broader society. These might be entirely
non-political: a favorite sports team, a common set of
recreational activities, or institutional affiliations with
a school or workplace. Such an analysis might reveal
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promising areas where the intentional launching of
social activities targeted at bridging certain clusters of
individuals might serve to bring these dissident elements more in contact with the broader population.
Where an unmobilized individual begins to have multiple connections to individuals in the dissident group,
peer influence may play a significant role in increasing
the individual’s anti-government sympathies.
In this respect, the cartographic shift in information warfare may work to augment the effectiveness
of existing approaches that focus on contesting a specific belief or opinion. Rather than simply attempting
to win the argument by spreading certain messages,
influence campaigns can also attempt to manipulate
peer behaviors to accelerate the adoption or rejection
of certain ideas en masse.
But this is not all. The capacity to manipulate social
ties also expands the potential targets of information
warfare. For one, this capacity suggests an expanded
ability to attack and degrade social cohesion writ
large. The shift from altering a targeted belief to shaping underlying networks is important because these
relationships are the source of social capital within
a society.126 Social capital is the “connections among
individuals―social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.”127
As Francis Fukuyama observes, social capital is critical as it lowers transactional costs in the economic
sphere and “promot[es] the associational life which is
necessary for the success of limited government and
modern democracy.”128 From individuals and groups
to institutions and governments, a society―particularly liberal democracies―must be able to create and
conserve pools of social capital to function.
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Second, the capacity to target social ties accurately
also allows the manipulation of what we might call
the “metabolism” of knowledge―the creation, spread,
and updating of accepted facts through a society.
Social ties define what sources are trusted, what processes of checking information are considered legitimate, and the groups and institutions that define the
social criteria under which information is discarded.129 Information shared by one’s established friends
may be considered more credible or trustworthy than
information shared by a stranger. These peers may
also play a role in establishing norms around what
sources are acceptable and which are to be rejected
out of hand. Having multiple trusted associates react
incredulously to information published by a given
news outlet might erode the willingness of an individual to believe or distribute information from that
source going forward. Manipulating these micro-level
dynamics at scale across a society opens the possibility
of influencing the overall practice of knowledge generation and dissemination.
The Aims of Information Warfare
The terms of what is contestable define the terms
of victory and defeat. In a world of limited or highcost visibility into social behavior, information warfare focuses on contests over the specific beliefs and
points of view held by a population. Victory entails
the adoption of a belief desired by a contestant and
defeat entails the inability to deny the adoption of an
adversary belief by a population.
However, these terms of victory may become
hollow as the strategic environment itself changes.
An actor with aims that center on shaping a specific
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belief may be at the mercy of an actor who focuses on
obtaining the capacity to shape the underlying social
ties of a society. Even if the former succeeds in spreading a belief, the adoption of that belief may be fragile
or temporary if the social structure of a population is
rendered unsupportive or if the sources of this belief
are considered categorically false by the population at
large. Consider an effort launched by a government
to persuade the public that its military is succeeding
in a war. This effort might be supported by state-run
mass media channels which give the government the
capacity to blanket the public with messaging. However, this persuasive campaign may nonetheless fail if
an adversary can erode public trust in the mass media
generally and build social ties between alternative
online media outlets and groups of influential citizens
within a society.
Similarly, a singular focus on changing a target
set of beliefs may be blind to the damage of campaigns which attempt to erode social cohesion broadly
through the manipulation of underlying social ties.
These campaigns may not attempt to promote a particular belief but, instead, introduce multiple, even
conflicting, ideas to fragment relationships between
groups in a society. In our example, a government
overly focused on bolstering the credibility of its military and fending off criticisms that it is not effective
may not be alert to the damage produced by a persuasive campaign that simply seeks to maximize controversy around the issue and drive the polarization of
supporters and detractors. Such an adversary may at
times actually work to promote certain individuals
and groups aligned with the government position,
insofar as it helps to prolong an internal conflict.
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To this end, the cartographic shift in information
warfare also shapes the terms of success or failure
in the space. What is contested is not superiority in
the ability to control specific beliefs or options, but
the capacity to control the topology of relationships
within a society. Spreading a belief may become an
instrument in achieving this aim, but doing so may no
longer in and of itself be the primary end of information warfare. Victory entails the capture of this structural influence, while defeat entails the inability to
deny this influence to adversaries.
The Conduct of Modern Information Warfare:
From Attrition to Maneuver
The cartographic shift also helps us to articulate
more concretely shifts in the effective conduct of information warfare. Borrowing from a distinction made
by the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) in its core strategic
doctrine, persuasive warfare has been traditionally a
war of attrition.130 “Warfare by attrition pursues victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy’s material assets by superior firepower.”131 From
leafletting to radio broadcasts, information warfare by
attrition has characterized many of the “classic” tactics
deployed by state and nonstate actors. These tactics
attempt to blanket an entire social ecosystem, hoping
to change opinions or otherwise reduce morale. This
is a natural application of strategic persuasion in a
world of limited knowledge about the architecture of
connections and beliefs that make up a target group or
society.
Information warfare waged as “warfare by maneuver” has been traditionally less common. This is a
kind of information warfare where, “Rather than
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pursuing the cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal, the goal is to attack the
enemy ‘system’―to incapacitate the enemy systemically
[italics in original].”132 This operational mode emphasizes the identification and targeting of vulnerabilities
that render an adversary unable to “function as part
of a cohesive whole.”133 Where this has taken place
through more focused tactics, such as the subversion
of adversary groups or the targeting of particular
communities, the scope of operations has been relatively narrow and expensive.134 These efforts, which
have been difficult to use effectively, have only infrequently attempted to manipulate the flow of information through an entire society broadly writ. However,
the rich and up-to-date data around social behavior
significantly augments opportunities for conducting information warfare by maneuver and suggests
that the coming decades will see more offensives that
leverage these opportunities.135
Framing the evolution of information warfare as a
transition from attrition combat to maneuver combat
also helps to reconcile the apparent failure of netwar
and WikiLeaks to predict the continued strength and
even dominance of centralized actors like governments in this space. Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Assange
championed the ability of diffuse, “leaderless” networks of actors to systematically outcompete hierarchical organizational structures. In retrospect, it may
not have been strategic advantages inherent to a particular organizational form, but, instead, that these
types of diffuse organizations―criminal networks,
terrorist organizations, international transparency
movements―were simply the first to adopt techniques
which nimbly leveraged the targeting and iteration
made possible by the web. As it turns out, a diverse
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variety of actors can take advantage of warfare by
maneuver, as Russia’s activities in the space demonstrate. The correct strategic characterization, in the
end, may not have been combat between different
organizational forms―hierarchies vs. networks―but
combat between different styles of information warfare―attrition vs. maneuver.
So, what does information warfare by maneuver
look like in practice? The successful conduct of these
more targeted campaigns requires operations that
combine three attributes: effective obfuscation, effective iteration, and effective automation.
Effective Obfuscation
Information warfare by maneuver is most effective
when it maintains a low profile and is challenging to
detect. This enables operations to proceed and influence the social landscape long before they are noticed
and reacted to by an adversary. This is possible
because of three factors, two of which parallel aspects
of operations in the broader domain of cybersecurity.
First, definitively attributing a given threat online to a
particular person or entity in the real world can be difficult.136 Second, the potential attack surface for these
operations―all sites of social activity online―is expansive and not easily tracked in a comprehensive way
by those likely to be the targets of these campaigns.
Beyond more public social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, influence campaigns might also
take place through less-visible private channels like
Whatsapp and Signal, where it is less straightforward
to obtain data.
The cartographic shift in information warfare is
a third important factor. Rather than blanketing an
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entire target population with a message, operations
focus on identifying and influencing smaller key constituencies. Moreover, a focus on shaping networks
and relationships rather than promoting a given idea
enables persuasive efforts that might appear to have
no direct relationship to promoting a consistent ideology or point of view. Efforts to expand the audience of
radical elements within a society, for instance, might
focus on bridging hard-core supporters with other
groups through an innocuous common interest.137
This hinders efforts to ascertain the ultimate intent of
a given set of persuasive actions observed online, or
even to identify it as part of a larger campaign.
It is worth contrasting this environment with earlier information warfare techniques. Operations such
as leafletting and radio broadcasts are highly distinct
from the types of persuasive efforts which are possible online. For one, the distribution medium―handbills dropped from a plane or a broadcast that anyone
can tune into―can make it extremely apparent that a
persuasive effort is taking place. These efforts are also
considerably more attributable than online operations,
given the physical requirements for distributing these
messages. Planes must take off and refuel from a given
location, and a sufficiently powerful radio transmitter
is needed for a blanket broadcast. In short, the operational profile of these earlier techniques is “noisier”;
adversaries are more likely to be alerted to the presence of these techniques. This makes the possibility
of encountering dedicated and effective counter-messaging and countermeasures more likely than in the
online context, where detection may take a long time
or never occur at all.
Successful obfuscation also buttresses a second
operational need for effective information warfare by
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maneuver―that of iteration. Since influence can be
low profile, operations can be conducted in an agile
and iterative fashion, which is needed to assess what
persuasive techniques will be most effective in a specific context.
Effective Iteration
Information warfare by maneuver is most effective when it is agile and highly iterative. The visibility that the Internet provides into social activity
enables both attackers and defenders to contest each
other on a highly granular, targeted level. However,
seeing and mastery are not the same: the ecosystem of
influence and persuasion remains an extremely noisy
one. There is a vast range of intervening factors, and
modeling social behavior remains an inexact science
at present.138 The success of one persuasive tactic does
not necessarily guarantee the success of the next, and
causal relationships between action and result are frequently challenging to assess.
This chaotic environment is exacerbated by a continually shifting set of targets, obscuring which to aim
at that would produce the biggest impact on a target
society. Clausewitz speaks of a “center of gravity”
in military maneuver―“sources of moral or physical strength, power and resistance.”139 The optimal
target of military operations in that classic treatment
is the center of gravity.140 However, in the information
warfare context, the center of gravity is frequently in
motion in a society―there may be different centers of
gravity that exist across different domains and arenas
of belief. These centers of gravity may shift across
individuals and institutions as influence waxes and
wanes, guided by the changing relationships between
actors in a society.
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What applies on the physical battlefield may also
apply in the information space. USMC doctrine could
be describing the persuasive conditions of the modern
web when it writes:
past battlefields could be described as linear formations
and uninterrupted linear fronts, we cannot think of
today’s battlefield in linear terms. . . . modern weapons
have increased dispersion. . . . the natural result of
dispersion is unoccupied areas, gaps, and exposed flanks
which can and will be exploited, blurring the distinction
between front and rear and friendly- and enemycontrolled areas.141

For the USMC, the key factor for success in such
an environment is agility―“rapid, flexible, opportunistic maneuver.”142 The same may be true in the contemporary online information warfare space, where a
highly iterative and improvisational cadence of activity is required to be effective. This is made particularly
possible given the relative low cost and low profile of
these operations, which enables continuous experimentation and multiple attempts at exerting influence.
Speed becomes a particularly key operational necessity, allowing attackers to recognize opportunities and
exploit them before a target has the chance to react.143
This strategic picture is one that matches with reality: what is known of the 2016 Russian effort was that
it operated on a highly decentralized, fast-moving,
improvisational basis.144
Effective Automation
Information warfare by maneuver is most effective when it leverages automation, both as a means
of expanding operational capacity and as a target of
operations. The sheer scale and complexity of social
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activity online―a factor enabling obfuscation and
necessitating rapid iteration―presents another challenge to the successful execution of information warfare by maneuver. How is an operation able to identify
the correct targets from such a broad field of potential
targets? How is it able to engage with all potential targets simultaneously? Automation plays an important,
if not necessary, role in being able to project influence
in a targeted way across the scale of the persuasive
terrain online.
One dimension of this is in the expansion of operational capacity. For one, social data and analytics play
a major role in identifying potential targets and assessing the relative success or failure of a persuasive tactic.
Automating this assessment augments the maneuver
capacity of a persuasive effort: it becomes more possible to understand the “system” of a target population and the dynamics that might cause it to shift to
a desired state. Bots―automated accounts purporting
to be real users on a platform―also have emerged in
some recent online influence campaigns, a means by
which to expand the ability for a small team to engage
on a direct basis with many users and shape the
conversation.145
Second, automation itself can also be a target of
operations. By and large, online social platforms filter
and recommend content and social interactions to
users autonomously through algorithms. These algorithms play a major role in shaping the flow of information through a society and the social behavior of
the public.146 The algorithms can also shape the relative influence and financial strength of key groups
that contribute to the definition of the flow of information through a society. For instance, journalists,
and the press more generally, have had their fortunes
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shaped by the algorithmic specifics of platforms like
Facebook and Google.147 By manipulating the algorithms of a service or the incentives of the companies
that run them, an attacker or defender can shape the
persuasive landscape to his or her advantage.148 YouTube’s recommendation system, which links users to
relevant videos based on the video just watched, has
seen precisely this kind of manipulation. During the
2016 election, bots and false “sock puppet” accounts
were deployed to nudge the system toward recommending a range of conspiracy theories around the
Clinton campaign.149
This assessment of the operational features of
online information warfare begs the question of
defense. If effective obfuscation, effective iteration,
and effective automation are necessary for conducting
successful operations in this space, what is necessary
for mounting a successful defense against these kinds
of campaigns? The increased visibility of group social
behavior made possible by the Internet again provides
a way forward.
Defense in Modern Information Warfare
At the time of this writing, current approaches to
defending or countering campaigns of online disinformation like the ones seen in the 2016 U.S. election are
quite limited in their specificity. Some analyses suggest changes in messaging, concluding that the United
States should engage in counter-propaganda to fight
these campaigns.150 These include “coordinated
effort[s] to saturate contested IO realms with images
and messages of American prosperity and freedom.”151
This could also take the form of a coalition, a:
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United Front, as it were, of truth-seeking nations, soberly
facing their opponents, willing to accept the airing of
one’s own imperfection for the sake of improvement, and
committed to the norm that there is an objective reality
that matters.152

Others believe that “the antidote to Netwar poison is
active transparency” and call for “a new vision and
purpose for the military based on preservation of
credibility and trust.”153 There is also occasionally resignation, with one analysis suggesting that the hybrid
warfare approaches adopted by Russia allow its information warfare capabilities to “gain degrees of speed
and agility that U.S. joint doctrine and policy cannot
hope to match.”154
While these prescriptions may advise particular
actions that might be useful in part, the overriding
weakness of many existing analyses is the vagueness
of their proposals. While it may be helpful to respond
to propaganda with “messages of American prosperity and freedom,” it is unclear what such messages
look like, how they would be deployed, and whether
they would be effective against campaigns directed
toward manipulating underlying social ties and
relationships.155
This in part reflects the fog of war that has traditionally characterized information warfare operations
and the level of abstraction that its strategic thinking
has been historically forced to resolve. Even the suggestion that such messaging should be “saturated”
reflects earlier information wars of attrition rather
than the wars of maneuver that may now be possible.156 Countering “firehose of falsehood” strategies
might not rely on the development of a reciprocal
“firehose of truth” but, instead, require a more targeted approach.157 The increased visibility of social
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data enables us to articulate what such an effective
defense strategy would look like with a significantly
higher level of specificity.
Defense in the Context of Liberal Democracy
Liberal democracies face distinct vulnerabilities
and constraints in developing an effective defense
against the current generation of information warfare.
As earlier, the nature of modern persuasive warfare
is shaped by the ability to observe social interaction
and behavior at a highly granular level. Conflicts shift
from contests over the adoption or rejection of certain
ideas and points of view to contests over the network
structure of relationships and strength of ties within a
population. Victory in these conditions entails capturing the ability to shape these networks toward desired
ends, while defeat entails the inability to deny this
influence to an adversary.
Liberal democracies face an additional challenge.
The relationships among individuals and groups
within a society are important not only because they
influence behavior at a deep level but also because they
produce social capital, “the norms of reciprocity and
trustworthiness that arise from [social networks].”158
Social capital is key to the effective functioning of liberal democracies.159 Nevertheless, liberal democracies
must also defend more than their social capital. Societies that lack trust in all institutions beyond a single
leader or an institution such as the military are not liberal democracies. At best, they are illiberal democracies or democracies in name only.160
To that end, liberal democracies must not only
defend the aggregate amount of social capital or trust
within a society. They must also defend a particular
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arrangement of social capital―one which gives independent civil society and public institutions a primary role.161 Trust in independent journalistic entities,
for instance, is one critical component which ensures
that liberal democracies function appropriately.162 In
this view, liberal democracies may face defeat in the
arena of information warfare in two ways: either by
an inability to resist the influence of an adversary in
the landscape of connections within a society or in
the depletion of social capital and trust held by civil
society. This may make liberal democracies acutely
vulnerable to the high-precision targeting available to
modern offensive IO. Because liberal democracies rely
on a diffuse ecosystem of actors to generate and maintain trust within a society, there exists a broad potential attack surface of organizations that an adversary
might choose to manipulate or disrupt.
This dual commitment to securing a society’s
social capital and securing a particular distribution
of social capital also proscribes the set of tactics that
a military specifically, or the government generally,
might deploy in defending this ecosystem. A liberal
democracy which implements a government-run
command-and-control regime to filter truth from falsity, for instance, surrenders a key priority in a rush
to defend against disinformation threats, though it
may protect some absolute quantity of trust within
a society. State intervention might seek to protect
or strengthen a public against manipulation, but to
the extent that they attempt to replace or supplant a
robust ecosystem of civil society, these interventions
violate democratic commitments.163
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Architecture of a Defensible Public
In light of these vulnerabilities and constraints,
liberal democracies must work to construct defensible publics, an ecosystem of nongovernmental organizations and institutions that are themselves robust
against attempts to manipulate and disrupt their
capacity for creating and accumulating social capital. The trick is to facilitate and support this robustness without supplanting the independent function
that these groups play within the context of a liberal
democracy. Three essential building blocks appear
to be necessary to lay the foundation for an effective
defense.
Construct Public Systems of Detection
Obfuscation is a core element of effective online
IO. It enables adversaries to pursue their efforts without resistance or counter-messaging. It facilitates
ongoing iteration and multiple attempts to develop
the set of persuasive techniques most fitted to a specific goal and context. It permits widespread use of
bots and automation to scale the impact and scope
of persuasive operations. Exposing that these techniques are in use, particularly by foreign adversaries,
can help to rally further scrutiny, support the development of countermeasures by civil society, and pressure the platforms hosting this activity to take action.
This limits the options of those engaging in these campaigns and makes a public defensible.
However, civil society itself may lack the resources
to perform this detection effectively and credibly. It
may also lack the cohesiveness and capacity to compel
major online platforms to expose information around
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these campaigns promptly. The government could take
a role in ensuring a regular stream of verified analytics
about the social state of the web in the same manner
that it already does around public health, weather,
and the economy. Such a move would leverage a cartographic shift in support of defense. The same degree
of social visibility that permits an enhanced level of
accuracy in the targeting of influence efforts can, given
adequate resources, simultaneously make it more
straightforward to detect these efforts in progress.
Note that the military and government need not
make determinations around the truthfulness of a
given message and become “arbiters of truth” in
order to execute on this priority. Indeed, such an
effort would intrude on the role of civil society and
risk democratic commitments. The triad of elements
that make up contemporary online information warfare campaigns―the use of state-run media and informal infiltration of groups online, the manipulation of
channels of advertising, and leveraging hacking to
disrupt targets―can be monitored and exposed without necessarily speaking to the truth value of the messages being spread. These analytics might also focus
on exposing the occurrence of specific techniques; for
example, they could detect the use of swarms of bots
to spread messages on social media.
Support Robust Network Topologies
One way to view a defensible public is through the
lens of its network structure. Are there certain patterns
of relationships between individuals that are systematically more robust against manipulation and enable
an effective flow of trustworthy information? Why are
some networks of individuals better at detecting and
rooting out disinformation than others?164
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Research into these questions is ongoing, with a
range of results drawing on the rich social data now
available through social networks and other platforms.165 Literature points to a number of testable
hypotheses about the network features that facilitate
or inhibit the spread of rumors within a network.
Elements such as the level of segregation within a
network, the degree of the transience of the information being spread, and the distribution of influential
users all play a role.166 Algorithms may also point
the way to identifying specific individuals who will
be most effective in helping to contain the spread of
disinformation.167
These results naturally lead to the question of intervention. Once it is understood what topologies are
more resistant to manipulation than others, the next
important step is to understand the types of forces
which can generate these configurations of people and
norms. This may take Assange’s notions of “simulated
annealing” for the purpose of defense.168 Incentives
and pressures might be introduced to encourage the
network structure of civil society and the public at
large to align in ways that are more able to contend
with campaigns of active manipulation. This might
manifest in a range of different ways. For instance,
changes to the way major social platforms recommend
new users to “friend” and distribute content could
encourage new network topologies between users
and communities online. Third-party tools might be
used to assist committed groups of users in injecting
counter-messaging into key networks and identifying
manipulative techniques in use.
The military and government can play a role in
facilitating the development of these techniques and
their transition into applied usage in two ways. First,
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the government might substantially expand its existing role in funding basic research on these topics,
helping to advance state-of-the-art technology and
provide promising practicable options for civil society to adopt. Second, the government might play a
role in launching viable testbeds for assessing these
approaches and hosting wargame simulations that
enable better preparedness and coordination among a
network of key institutions.
Clearly Define Policies of Intervention
Civil society may not always be able to serve as
an effective bulwark against a state-sponsored, wellresourced, information warfare effort. The resources
of states remain substantial, and a diffuse civil society
of journalistic organizations and activist groups may
not have the tools, or even the legal authorities needed
to combat a dedicated influence effort effectively.
Given the resources needed to execute these types of
advanced campaigns, we might expect their occurrence to not be the norm―though, to the extent that
they do emerge, they present a salient threat. In these
cases, the ability for the military and government to
act forcefully in the space may be critical to shielding
the ecosystem of civil society from major threats or
balancing the power of platforms that may be abetting
significant disinformation campaigns.
Again, such an intervention requires striking a delicate balance. While the authority and capabilities of
the military are significant, the commitments of liberal democracy prevent it from deep interventions or
efforts to supplant entirely the role that civil society
plays in facilitating information flow and managing
social capital. Doing so would erode trust and harm
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the independent ecosystem of information key to
maintaining the system itself.
In collaboration with civil society, the government should work to develop a set of agreed-upon
“red lines” which would specify the conditions and
manner under which a nation’s military would act
to mitigate the harm from major campaigns of information warfare. Reflecting on the netwar literature
of the 1990s, one scholar has written, “defense by the
government of the targeted population is appropriate
and called for” in the event of state-actor manipulation of the social sphere.169 This project envisions the
creation and evolution of protocols for escalation and
retaliation, advocating for “careful work . . . to limn
what falls on what side of a line, so as to neither be
provoked too readily, raising the specter of mutual or
even accidental escalation.”170 Enforcing the terms of
these protocols would again require the leveraging of
the increased social visibility made possible through
the Internet to determine when an agreed-upon set of
emergency conditions have been met.
To avoid overreach, it will be necessary to define
the terms of this policy with specificity. Merely designating “influence by a foreign power” as sufficient for
triggering intervention would invite abuse. It is necessary to define a scope of the institutions or networks
that are considered out of bounds and a definition of
the kinds of influence techniques that would necessitate action. If disseminated in a public manner, these
declared boundaries could play an important role in
shaping the international norms of engaging in these
information warfare activities as various states consider the value and consequences of using these types
of techniques going forward.
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CONCLUSION
The disinformation campaigns of 2016 should not
be seen in isolation. Russian activities during the U.S.
election were intimately linked to the history of information warfare and act as one dramatic exemplar of
how the Internet has changed, and will continue to
change, the nature of strategic influence and persuasion. As always, the challenge is to design a response
that will not just counter the specifics of a particular
threat, but tackle the emerging class of challenges as
well. The Russian example should provoke a deeper
exploration of the underlying dynamics that enabled
that campaign and will enable others going forward.
As the flow of information through a society
continues to change under the influence of a rapidly changing technological ecosystem, so too must
our strategic concept of information warfare evolve
to keep up. Without granular access to and detailed
understanding of large-scale social behavior, defense
thinking around information warfare and the impact
of technology on it have been lacking in several
important respects. In particular, strategic literature
has been largely limited in its characterization of the
essential nature of information warfare, the optimal
conduct of that conflict, and the articulation of a clear
approach toward defense in the space.
Technological change allows us to expand and
sharpen these to-date missing or vaguely articulated pillars of information warfare strategy. One
salient shift argued here is the extent to which the
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contemporary Internet facilitates a dramatic transition in the ability of actors to perceive and understand
the social behavior of large groups within a society.
This shift, which has been facilitated by the rise of
social networking platforms, significantly changes the
operational context of information warfare. Access to
data enables a highly granular approach to influence,
enabling the identification and low-cost targeting of
specific individuals and communities of interest. This
enables a precision attack on the network structure
and social capital of a community in a way that shifts
information warfare from a combat of attrition to a
combat of maneuver.
Rich data about social activity also enables the
construction of a strategy for defense in the online
environment. In liberal democracies, the military and
government must walk a tightrope: defend and support an independent civil society which is endogenously robust against these campaigns, while avoiding
actions which would themselves supplant and undermine these institutions. This advocates for a role that
the military can play in using this data to expose these
campaigns and support basic research, reserving its
most forceful interventions for actions by adversaries
which present the most significant threats.
The Internet and information technology have
lowered the costs and expanded the set of adversaries that can launch information warfare campaigns,
and these campaigns seem poised to become more
effective with time. Executing a successful strategic
concept for the online environment will require real
investment in technologies and techniques which take
into account the modern online context of persuasive
warfare, rather than falling back on the strategies that
were designed for an earlier generation of informational conflict.
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